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ABSTRACT
This study aims to analyze the whether tax, foreign ownership, bonus 
plans and debt covenants effects to transfer pricing in the multinational 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia. This study uses audited financial 
statement of the manufacturing companies’. The research sample used in this 
study is the multinational manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in the 2012-2014 periods, amounting to 111. The analysis 
technique used in this research is a logistic regression. The results of this 
study showed that the taxes and foreign ownership have a significant positive 
effect on the company’s decision to transfer pricing while the bonus plan 
and debt covenant do not significantly influence the company’s decision 
to transfer pricing. 
Keywords: transfer pricing, tax, foreign ownership, bonus plan, debt 
covenant
INTRODUCTION
The economic globalization has brought the increasing impact of 
international transactions in the various countries of the world. The existence 
of a global cooperation agreement to establish a free market area or an 
Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) has resulted in the increasingly thin 
boundaries of the international transactions. AFTA has prompted a lot of 
external parties, which in this case is Multi-National Corporations MNCs) 
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to invest in the developing countries. One of the key issues faced concerning 
the foreign investments is transfer pricing. Transfer pricing is a company’s 
policy in deciding a transfer price of a transaction of commodities, services, 
intangible assets, or financial transactions conducted by a company. Transfer 
pricing is a classic issue in the taxation field, especially with regards to the 
international transactions undertaken by multinational corporations. 
Several researches on the tax motivation and its connection towards 
the decision of transfer pricing have been conducted. Yuniasih, Rasmini 
and Wirakusuma (2012) argued that taxes have an effect to the transfer 
pricing decision. The importance of a decision to conduct transfer pricing 
exercises will result in a globally lower tax payment in general. Bernard, 
Jensen and Schott (2006) have found out that the transaction price of the 
related party is connected to the tax level and import tariff in the country of 
destination. Beside taxes, transfer pricing exercises can also be influenced 
by non-tax reasons, such as foreign ownership. A controlling shareholder 
according to Pernyataan Standar Akuntasi Keuangan (PSAK) no. 15 is an 
entity that has a 20% share or more either directly or indirectly so that it 
is considered to have a significant influence in controlling the company. 
Kiswanto and Purwaningsih (2014) have stated that foreign ownership 
positively influences the transfer pricing. A bonus mechanism is also 
considered as one of the indicators of the company’s decision to carry out 
the transfer pricing. Hartati, Desmiyawati and Nur Azlina (2014) stated 
that the bonus mechanism has an effect on the transfer pricing decision. 
The bonus mechanism is one of the strategies or calculation motives in the 
accountancy whose purpose is to give an appreciation to the directors or 
management based on the overall company’s profits.
Debt covenants have been found to influence transfer. In line with 
the debt covenant hypothesis a company having a high debt ratio prefers 
to conduct an accounting policy that can make the company’s profit higher. 
The company’s tendency is to choose the accounting procedures with profit 
changes reported from a future period to the present one, and one of the 
profit-change practices is by transfer pricing. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Transfer pricing is a company’s policy in deciding the transfer price of a 
transaction of goods, services, intangible assets, or financial transactions 
conducted by the company. There are two groups of transactions in transfer 
pricing, that is, intra-company’s and inter-company’s transfer pricing.
The Effect of Taxes on Transfer Rates
One of the reasons the company carries out transfer pricing is taxes. 
Taxes are people’s contribution  to the State Fund based on the Law (which 
can be imposed) without getting any service in return (contra-prestige) that 
can be directly shown  and used to pay for general expenses (Mardiasmo, 
2011). Gusnardi (2009), states that the multinational companies carry out 
the transfer pricing in order to minimize the global tax liabilities of their 
companies.
The companies report lower profits in their financial statements; one of 
the methods practiced by companies to lower the profits is by transfer pricing 
(Yani, 2001). The tax motivation of transfer pricing in the multinational 
companies is carried out by any possible means of transferring their revenue 
to countries with the lowest or minimal tax burden where the countries have 
their groups or divisions in operation. Yuniasih, Rasmini and Wirakusuma 
(2012) revealed that taxes have positive influences on a company’s decision 
to carry out transfer pricing. Higher tax burden triggers the companies to 
carry out transfer pricing in the hope that they can press down the burden. 
In the business practices, the businessmen generally identify tax payment 
as an expense so they will always try to minimize it in order to optimize 
the profits.
The Influence of Foreign Ownership on Transfer Pricing
Companies in Asia including Indonesia mostly have concentrated 
ownership structures (Dynaty, Utama, Rossieta & Veronica, 2011). 
Concentrated ownership structures tend to create a conflict of interests 
among controlling shareholders and their management and non-controlling 
shareholders. Foreign controlling shareholders sell the products of the 
companies controlled by them to their private companies at a price below the 
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market price. Foreign controlling shareholders do it in order to gain personal 
profits and to harm the non-controlling shareholders (Atmaja, 2011). When 
the ownership of shares owned by foreign controlling shareholders is 
getting bigger, the foreign controlling shareholders have more influences to 
determine various decisions in the company, including the policy of price 
determination as well as the total of transfer pricing transactions (Sari, 2012).
Kiswanto (2014) states that foreign ownership has positive effects 
on the transfer pricing. The result is consistent with a research conducted 
by Dynaty, Utama, Rossieta and Veronica (2011) that when foreign parties 
have done their investment in the Indonesian public companies with a 
percentage of more than 20%, they can give significant influences on a 
decision of transfer pricing which involves foreign parties. Thus, the bigger 
the foreign ownership in a company, the higher the foreign party’s influence 
in determining the extent of transfer pricing to be carried out.
The Influence of Bonus Plan on Transfer Pricing
A positive accounting theory suggests three hypotheses of profit 
management, namely: (1) the bonus plan hypothesis, (2) the debt covenant 
hypothesis, and (3) the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). The bonus program hypothesis (the bonus plan hypothesis) explains 
that company’s managers with a bonus plan tend to choose accounting 
procedures with changed profits that are reported from a future period to 
the present one.
Managers tend to take advantage of transfer pricing transactions to 
maximize the bonus they receive (Lo, Raymond & Micheal, 2010). So it 
can be concluded that the managers will tend to perform transfer pricing in 
order to maximize the bonus they receive. Hartati, Desmiyawati and Azlina 
(2014) revealed that the bonus mechanism affects the transfer pricing; it is 
because, in giving the bonuses to the directors, the company’s owner will 
surely consider their performance in managing his company. In this case, 
the company’s owner will check the generated company’s overall profits as 
an assessment to the directors’ performance. For this purpose, the directors 
will do their best, including the Transfer Pricing practices, to increase the 
overall company’s profits.
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The Influence of Debt Covenant on Transfer Pricing
In the theory of positive accountancy of Watt and Zimmerman (1986), 
one of the three profit management hypotheses is the Debt Covenant 
Hypothesis.  In this hypothesis, all the other things remain steady; when 
a company is getting closer to an accounting violation which is based on 
a debt agreement, the tendency is more likely that a company’s manager 
chooses an accounting procedure with changed profits which is reported 
from a future period to the present one. 
The higher of the company’s debt ratio, the greater of the likelihood 
for the managers to select accounting procedures that can increase the 
profits. One of the methods implemented by the company to increase the 
profits and to avoid the credit regulations is transfer pricing. The higher of 
the debt ratio, the closer of the company to the expiry of the agreement or 
the regulation of the credit. The higher of the credit limit, the greater of the 
likelihood of the violation of the credit agreement. The managers will have 
accounting methods that can increase the profits so that they can loosen the 
credit limit and reduce the costs of technical mistakes. Frame work of this 
research shows at Figure 1.
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RESEARCH METHODS
The object of this research is to examine whether taxes, foreign ownership, 
bonus mechanism and debt covenant influence transfer pricing practices. 
The research units are multinational manufacturing entities in the sectors 
of chemical and base industries, various industries and consumer goods 
industries in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The analysis units are the 
audited financial reports of 2012-2014 periods. The population targets in 
this research are the entities of multinational manufacturing in the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. The entity selection is based on sampling purposes. This 
research used one dependent variable and four independent variables to 
analyze the tax influence, foreign ownership, bonus mechanism and debt 
covenant against the companies’ decisions to carry out the transfer pricing 
in the manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
A dependent variable is a type of variable affected or explained by an 
independent variable. The dependent variable in this research is transfer 
pricing. Transfer pricing is calculate with a dichotomous approach, that is, 
by seeing the sales to the parties having special relationship. Using a dummy 
variable, the companies that sell to the parties having special relationship 
are rated “1”, while those who do not are rated “0” (Yuniasih, Rasmini & 
Wirakusuma, 2012).
Tax (X1)
The tax in this research is represented by an effective tax rate which 
is the ratio of tax expense divided by a taxable profit (Yuniasih, Rasmini 
& Wirakusuma, 2012).
 
ETR  =  tax expense – differed tax expense
taxable profit
Foreign Ownership (X2)
The foreign ownership is represented by the share ownership 
percentage over 20% as a controlling shareholder. The creteria of a 
concentrated ownership structure are based on the Capital Market Law 
No. IX.H.1 which explains that a controlled shareholder is a party who has 
shares or equity securities of 20% or more (Mutamimah, 2008).  
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Bonus Mechanism (X3)
Bonus plan is calculated using the net income trend index (ITRENDLB) 
which is calculated based on the net income achievement percentage in year 
t against net income in year t-1. Irpan 2010 in Hartati, Desmiyawati and 
Azlina (2014).
ITRENDLB  = Net profit year t – net profit year t-1
net profit year t-1
Debt Covenant (X4) 
This research used proxy from leverage level, namely: debt to asset 
ratio. Qiang (2003) in Fatmariani (2013). 
DAR  = Total DebtTotal Asset  x100%
The Logistic Regression Model used in this research is as follows:
TP= α + β1TAX + β2ASING + β3BONUS + β4DEBT + e
Description:
TP = Transfer Pricing
α = constant
TAX = Tax
FOREIGN = Foreign Ownership
BONUS = Bonus Mechanism
DEBT = Debt Covenant
e = Residual error (Error Coefficient)
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistic Analysis
Table 1 depicted Descriptive Statistics of the sample. The mean value 
for tax variable (TAX) shows that the average value is 0.3011. It indicates 
that the tax rates of the companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
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in 2012-2014 is in the average of 30.11%. However, the tax variation’ range 
is high enough, shown by the different amount between the maximum 
value of 1.36 and the minimum value of 0.65. And, this variable indicates 
a deviation standard of 0.211.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. Deviation
Transfer Pricing 111 .00 1.00 88.00 .7928 .40714
Tax 111 -.65 1.36 33.42 .3011 .21078
Foreign Ownership 111 9.39 12.49 1200.20 10.8126 .75394
Bonus Mechanism 111 -4.51 22.40 45.08 .4062 2.35897
Debt Covenent 111 .01 1.01 41.82 .3768 .19780
Valid N (listwise) 111
The foreign ownership variable shows that the average value is 10.81. 
It indicates that the companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2011-2014 that have a log of the total foreign share ownership used the 
controlling shareholder’s right to carry out transfer pricing. While the 
values of maximum, minimum and standard deviations of this variable are 
12.49, 9.39 and 0.753.
The bonus mechanism variable has an average value of 0.406. It shows 
the bonus mechanism proxied by the net income trend Index (ITRENDLB), 
a total of 40.6% of sample companies use the profit enlargement method for 
their bonus plan. While the values of maximum, minimum and deviation 
standard in this variable are 22.40, -4.51 and 2.358. The Variable Debt 
Covenant proxied by DAR (debt to asset ratio) has the average value of 
0.3768 which shows that the leverage level of the observed companies is 
37.68%. It means that 37.68% of the observed companies use foreign debts 
to finance their companies or to do the expansion.
Partial Hypothesis Test
Table 2 shows the test results by the logistic regression at the 
significance level of 5%. The regression model that was formed based on 
the estimated parameter value in the variables in the equation is as follows:
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TP = -5.896 + 3.136 TAX + 0.812 ASING + 0.142 BONUS – 1.171 
DEBT - α
The results of partial hypothesis tests show that tax and foreign 
ownership affect positively on a company’s decision to carry out transfer 
pricing. This can be seen from the significance level of 0.012 and 0.045 
each which is less than 0.05. The results are consistent with the proposed 
hypothesis. While the bonus mechanism and the debt covenant have no 
influence on the company’s decision to carry out transfer pricing, it can be 
seen from the significance level of 0.590 and 0.398 which are greater than 
0.005. This result is not consistent with the proposed hypothesis.
Table 2: Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1a TAX 3.316 1.251 6.288 1 .012 .043
ASING .812 .404 4.028 1 .045 2.251
BONUS .142 .263 .290 1 .590 1.152
DEBT -1.171 1.384 .716 1 .398 .310
Constant -5.896 4.171 1.998 1 .158 .003
Tax Influence on A Company’s Decision to Carry out Transfer 
Pricing    
High tax rates cause  the tax burden endured  by a company to grow 
so bigger that the company tends to choose transfer pricing as an alternative 
to minimize the tax burden they pay. The higher the tax rates applied to 
a company, the higher the business entity’s decision to carry out transfer 
pricing. This result is consistent with the research conducted by Yuniasih, 
Rasmini and Wirakusuma (2012) that taxes have positive influence on 
company’s decisions to carry out transfer pricing. Bigger tax burden triggers 
companies to carry out transfer pricing in the hope of pressing it down. 
Because in the business practice, the businessmen generally equate 
the tax payment as a burden so that they always try to minimize it in order 
to optimize the profits. The research has successfully proved that taxes 
influence company’s decisions to carry out transfer pricing. It is supported 
by the previous researches conducted by Yuniasih, Rasmini and Wirakusuma 
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(2012), Jacob (1996), and Hartati, Desmiyawati and Azlina (2014). The 
results of the researches state that taxes have influences on company’s 
decisions to carry out transfer pricing.
Influence of Foreign Ownership on Company’s Decisions to 
Carry out Transfer Pricing
If foreign ownership in a company is more than 20%, the decision of a 
business entity in using the transfer pricing policy is also greater. It is because 
the ownership percentage that grows bigger can make the shareholders be 
in a strong position to control including controlling the decisions regarding 
the extent of transfer pricing carried out by the company. The controlling 
shareholders according to PSAK No.15 are entities that have 20% shares or 
more either directly or indirectly so that the entities are considered to have 
significant influences on controlling the companies. The non-controlling 
shareholders are the entities that have shares less than 20% either directly 
or indirectly so that they are considered not to have significant influences 
on controlling the companies. The non-controlling shareholders entrust 
the controlling shareholders to supervise the management because the 
controlling shareholders have a better position and have access to better 
information so that it is possible for them to abuse the control rights for their 
own welfare (Dion, 2009). One of them is by carrying out transfer pricing.
The results are in line with the research conducted by Dynaty, Utama, 
Rossieta and Veronica (2011) that when foreign parties have invested in the 
Indonesian public companies with a percentage of more than 20%, they can 
give significant influences to the transfer pricing decisions involving foreign 
parties.  Therefore, the bigger the foreign ownership in a company, the higher 
the foreign influences on determining the extent of transfer pricing to be 
carried out. Yuniasih, Rasmini and Wirakusuma (2012) states that a tunneling 
incentive (share ownership percentage) influences positively on a decision 
of transfer pricing. The structures of company’s share ownership tend to be 
concentrated so that the control rights belong to the minority of shareholders. 
Transactions among specially related parties are more commonly used for 
the purpose of wealth transfer than dividend payment because the companies 
listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange must distribute the dividend to the 
parent companies and the other minority shareholders.
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The research has successfully proved that the foreign ownership 
influences the company’s decisions to carry out transfer pricing. It is 
supported by the results of the previous researches conducted by Dynaty, 
Utama, Rossieta and Veronica (2011); Yuniasih, Rasmini and Wirakusuma 
(2012); Jarallah and Kanazaki (2011). The research results state that the 
foreign ownership influence the company’s decisions to carry out transfer 
pricing. 
Influence of Bonus Mechanism on Company’s Decision to 
Carry out Transfer Pricing
In increasing the company’s profits the directors do not forever 
choose transfer pricing to increase the company’s profits to get bonuses. 
The theory is that the directors want high compensations in every period. 
If their compensations depend on the bonuses reported in the net income, 
they can possibly increase their bonuses in the said periods by reporting the 
net income as highly as possible. However, the multinational companies, 
in fact, tend to focus themselves on the tax burden of the business entities. 
How the companies can minimize the tax burden which they must bear is 
by way of reducing the company’s net income from the companies located 
in the countries having high company’s tax rates   to those having lower 
rates or to those as Tax Heaven Country. It can be done by way of transfer 
pricing. So that the bonus mechanism seen from the Net Income Trend Index 
does not influence the company’s decisions to carry out transfer pricing.
The owners, therefore, give bonuses not only to the directors who have 
successfully generated profits for their divisions and subunits, but also  to 
those who are willing to cooperate for the sake of and the overall benefit 
of the companies. It is supported by the opinion of Horngren, Datar and 
George (2008) stating that director’s compensations (bonuses) can be seen 
from the performances of various divisions or teams within one organization. 
The bigger the overall company’s generated profits, the better the directos’ 
image in the view of the company’s owners. This research is in line with 
the research conducted by Kharisma (2014) stating that bonus mechanism 
does not influence transfer pricing. However, this research is in contrast 
with the research conducted by Hartati, Desmiyawati and Azlina (2014) 
stating that bonus mechanism influences the decisions of transfer pricing.
36
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 11 Issue 2
Influence of Debt Covenant on Company’s Decision to Carry 
out Transfer Pricing
The high level of leverage ratio in the sample companies do not 
influence the company’s decisions to carry out transfer pricing. The theory is 
that the higher the debt ratio, the closer the companies to the agreement limits 
or credit regulations. The higher the credit limits, the greater the possibility 
of the credit agreement deviation and expenses so that the Managers will 
have accounting methods that can increase profits. 
Simultaneous Hypothesis Tests
The test results on Table 3 shows that chi-square value of 13.084 with a 
degree of freedom = 4, and significance level of 0.011 whose value is smaller 
than 0.05 (0.011 < 0.05). It shows that taxes, foreign ownership, bonus 
mechanism and debt covenant simultaneously influence the company’s 
decisions to carry out transfer pricing.
Table 3: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 13.084 4 .011
Block 13.084 4 .011
Model 13.084 4 .011
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Based on the results of the researches conducted in the manufacturing 
companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange beginning from 2012 
to 2014, it can be concluded that taxes positively influence the company’s 
decisions to carry out transfer pricing. It shows that high tax rates result 
in also higher company’s decisions to carry out transfer pricing. Foreign 
ownership positively influences the company’s decision to carry out 
transfer pricing. It shows that when the foreign ownership in one company 
is more than 20%, the controlling shareholder’s position is bigger so that 
the business entities’ decisions are also bigger in using the transfer pricing 
policy.  Bonus mechanism does not influence the company’s decisions to 
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carry out transfer pricing. Debt covenant does not influence the company’s 
decision to carry out transfer pricing. It shows that the high leverage ratio 
level in the sample companies does not influence the company’s decision 
to carry out transfer pricing to increase the profits.
 
This research is expected to provide some light to the government and 
policy maker to issue policies regarding transfer pricing by identifying the 
factors underlying the practice of transfer pricing policies. As such preventive 
policies can be developed in order to minimize the transfer pricing policies 
that harm the country and the society. This research is expected to be a 
motivation for the companies and management to implement the transfer 
pricing policies in line with the regulations issued by OECD Guidelines 
and The Directorate General of Taxation. It is very important considering 
the regulations made by OECD can already be implemented by most of the 
countries especially the tax regulations in Indonesia.
REFERENCES
Atmaja, L. S. (2011). Who Want To Be Rational Investor. Kepustakaan 
Populer Gramedia. Jakarta.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen J. B. & Schott., P. K. (2006). Transfer Pricing by 
US-Base Multinational Firms. NBER Working Paper.
Dion. (2009). Merger d an Akuisisi. http://dion.staff.gunadarma.ac.id
Dynaty, V., Utama, S., Rossieta, H. & Veronica, S. (2011). Pengaruh 
Kepemilikan Pengendali Akhir Terhadap Transaksi Pihak Berelasi. 
Thesis. University of Indonesia.
Fatmariani. (2013). Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan, Debt Covenant 
dan Growth Opportunities terhadap Konservatisme Akuntansi pada 
Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Jurnal 
Universitas Negeri Padang. Padang.
Gusnardi. (2009). Penerapan Harga Transfer Dalam Kajian Perpajakan. 
Pekbis Jurnal, 1(1), 36-43.
38
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 11 Issue 2
Hartati, W., Desmiyawati, & Azlina, N. (2014). Analisi pengaruh pajak 
dan mekanisme bonus terhadap keputusan transfer pricing Perusahaan 
Manufaktur Yang Listing Di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Jurnal Universitas 
Riau. 1-18.
Horngren, T, C., Datar, S. M. & George, F. (2008). Akuntansi Biaya dengan 
Penekanan Manajerial. Jakarta : Erlangga.
Jacob, J. (1996). Taxes and Transfer Pricing: Income Shifting and The 
Volume of Intrafirm Transfer. Journal of Accounting Research, 34(2), 
301-312.
Kharisma, L. (2014). Pengaruh pajak, tunneling incentive, dan kompensasi 
bonus terhadap keputusan transfer pricing pada perusahaan manufaktur 
yang terdaftar di BEI. Thesis. Mercu Buana University, Indonesia.
Kiswanto, N. & Purwaningsih., A. (2014). Pengaruh pajak, kepemilikan 
asing, dan ukuran perusahaan terhadap transfer pricing pada perusahaan 
maufaktur di BEI tahun 2010-2013. Jurnal Ekonomi Akuntansi, 1-15. 
Lo, W. Y. A., Raymond, M. K. W., & Micheal, F. (2010). Tax, Financial 
Reporting, and Tunneling Incentive for Income Shifting: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Transfer Pricing behavior of Chinese-Listed Companies. 
Journal of the American Taxation Association, 32(2), 1-26.
Mardiasmo. (2011). Perpajakan Edisi Revisi 2011. Yogyakarta : Penerbit 
Andi.
Mutamimah. (2008). Tunneling atau Value Added dalam Strategi Marger dan 
Akuisisi di Indonesia. Jurnal Manajemen Teori & Terapan, 2, 161-182.
Sari, R. C. (2012). Tunneling dam Model Prediksi: Bukti Empiris Pada 
Transaksi Pihak Berelasi. Thesis. Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia.
Watts. R. L. & Zimmerman. J. L., (1986), Positive Accounting Theory, 
London: Prentice-Hall. 
39
Transfer Pricing Practices
Yani, A. (2001). Motivasi Pajak Dalam Transfer Pricing. Bulletin Bussiness 
News. No. 6651.
 
Yuniasih, W. N., Rasmini, N. K. & Wirakusuma, M. G. (2012). Pengaruh 
Pajak Dan Tunneling Incentive Pada Keputusan Transfer Pricing 
Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang Listing Di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Jurnal 
dan Prosiding SNA-Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 15, Banjarmasin, 
Indonesia.
